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Which  Board  Interlocks  Matter?  The  Impact  of  Managerial  Power,  Legitimacy,  and 
Family Power on the Adoption of Stock Option Pay
Inter-organizational relationships and the networks they create are an important mechanism for 
the  transfer  of  knowledge  and  learning.  Network  ties  enable  the  transfer  of  experiential 
knowledge – for instance of vicarious information through board interlocks.  While we know that 
organizational learning occurs and is influenced by factors like the strength of ties and a firm’s 
position in the network, it is still unclear what causes the firm to act on the information gained 
through network ties. We build on prior studies on the impact of interlocking board ties ion the 
adoption of new practices and analyze the effects of different types of board ties on the adoption 
of a new practice that has yet to gain strong legitimacy in the institutional field. 
To study differences in the motivation and power of those who create inter-firm ties, we focus on 
the role of board interlocks in the adoption of stock option pay among Japanese firms. We 
investigate whether the effects of interlocks on the adoption of this new practice differs for sent 
ties – established when an executive of the focal firm serves on another firm’s board – and for 
received ties that are created when an executive of another firm sits on the focal firm’s board. 
We theorize that the observed effects vary by the type of tie that links the focal firm with a prior 
adopter. Executives of the focal firm who serve on the board of a prior adopter have managerial 
power to act on the information they obtained because they are in a position to make key 
decisions, while executives of a prior adopter who serve as outside directors on the board of the 
focal firm generally lack respective managerial power and hence only indirectly influence 
managerial decisions. When an executive has the motivation to adopt a new practice, for 
example to gain personal benefits, then this power difference will likely have even a greater 
impact on the adoption decision. 
Our findings show that sent ties are significantly related to the adoption of stock option pay 
whereas  received  ties  are  not,  thus  confirming  our  argument  that  managerial  power  and 
motivation  of  those  who  transfer  information  matter.  The  effects  of  sent  ties  are  further 
strengthened by large foreign ownership and high levels of industry diffusion suggesting their 
complementary  effects  on  managerial  power.  We also find  that  family  ownership  positively 
affects  the  impact  of  ties  on  the  adoption  of  stock  option  pay.  These  findings  suggest  that 
information is not sufficient for the new practice to be adopted but that managerial and family 
power is important in the adoption decision.
